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TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF
THE PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE: A
REPLY TO PROFESSOR MAYTON
Howard 0. Huntert
In his Article on first amendment process,' Professor Mayton chal-
lenges a "sacred cow" of current first amendment theology and, in so
doing, forces us to consider more carefully the implications of certain
accepted approaches to the resolution of disputes about speech. Much
of what he says about the process by which government restrains speech
is true, especially that the prior restraint doctrine has often been inade-
quately understood and inappropriately invoked.2 Nevertheless, some
of his premises are subject to question. Furthermore, his conclusion-
that a prior restraint model provides a better mechanism for the protec-
tion of speech than does a subsequent punishment modd 3-does not
necessarily follow from his premises, nor does the conclusion reflect an
adequate understanding of the prior restraint doctrine. What follows is
an effort to highlight some of these problems, in the hope that the argu-
ments presented will focus and perhaps add to Professor Mayton's
discussion.
I
THE PROBLEM OF COSTS
Professor Mayton argues that a state bent on restraining speech will
prefer a system of post-speech punishment because it is less costly than a
system favoring injunctive relief.4 There may sometimes be cost advan-
tages to a system of subsequent punishment, but certainly this is not
always the case. We can begin with two assumptions that lack empirical
t A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971, Yale University. Associate Professor of Law, Emory University
School of Law. [While this Article was in the stages of final preparation, Professor Blasi
published an article in the Minnesota Law Review that touches upon many of these issues.
Time constraints prevent an incorporation of Professor Blasi's ideas into this dialogue, but I
can say that I find myselfin general agreement with his conclusions. Se Blasi, Towarda Theory
of Prior Restraint The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REv. 11 (1981)-Author's Note].
I Mayton, Toward a Theor of First Amendment Process- Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Pun-
ishment, and the Costs of the Pi"or Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELLu L. REv. 245 (1982).
2 Id. at 247-49.
3 Id. at 279-81.
4 The cost of each enforcement process is measured both in terms of time, including
administrative delays, and in dollars spent. Id. at 266-74.
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support, but seem to make sense:5 (1) most people are risk-averse;6 and
(2) a government will prefer a simple, cost-effective means to reach a
certain end, all other things being equal. 7 Accordingly, we can posit
that most people will ordinarily act as self-censors and not engage in
speech that may lead to legal or social opprobrium. A government that
wants to limit speech will prefer the enforcement process that most effec-
tively induces a natural tendency toward self-censorship.8 This may or
may not be a subsequent punishment system.
Assume, for example, that an empirical study shows that the word
"mud," when spoken aloud or printed in newspapers, magazines, and
books of general circulation, causes antisocial behavior. Based on the
study, a state legislature decides to prohibit the use of the word "mud"
except in private communications and academic research. If the propo-
sition is debated in the legislature and if the study in question is publicly
discussed, the debate itself will have an educative effect that may begin
the entire process of self-censorship. Although iconoclasts, free-will
types, and others will shout "mud" in public places and write books
filled with thousands of "muds," the average citizen will eschew the use
of "mud" if told that its use leads to bad ends and may be punishable by
the state.9 Passage of a law prohibiting its use will further encourage the
self-censorship already begun.
To make its prohibition effective, the legislature will have to choose
an enforcement mechanism. The most effective means to censor printed
works, movies, videotapes or videodiscs would be an administrative li-
censing system. Although it may be highly effective, such a system
would hardly be cost-efficient, because it would require the creation of a
bureaucracy of indefinite duration. Furthermore, licensing schemes are
generally disfavored because they are especially intrusive. As Professor
Mayton correctly observes,10 the American doctrine of free speech was
5 These assumptions are developed at various points in Mayton's Article. See, e.g.,
Mayton, supra note 1, at 253-54, 256, 272.
6 This certainly seems to be true for businessmen. For an interesting discussion, see
Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attiludes Toward Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 693 (1973).
7 All other things are rarely equal. There may be good social or political reasons for
choosing a more expensive means, or the process of government may itself be so cumbersome
that the most cost-effective method is overlooked.
8 1 assume that the state has a legitimate interest in limiting speech and that it has the
power to do so. Although thepower is usually present, the legitimacy of the limitation is often
subject to question.
9 This will only be true if some societal consensus exists as to both the legitimacy of
state intervention and the dangers of the word "mud." As in most speech cases, the danger
lies not in the utterances but in the reactions of others to those utterances--in the actions likely
to occur rather than in the speech. Mayton correctly points out that the speech/action prob-
lem is central to an understanding of what is actually meant by free speech. Mayton, sura
note 1, at 253-59.
10 Id. at 247-49.
[Vol. 67:283
PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE
founded in large measure on opposition to the English system of licens-
ing-the classic prior restraint. Such procedures were once used widely
in this country to control pornography, but they have largely fallen into
desuetude, albeit more often for reasons of constitutional infirmity than
for purposes of governmental economy." In our example, then, the leg-
islature more likely will choose to enforce its prohibition either by pro-
viding criminal sanctions for use of the word "mud" or by granting
jurisdiction to the appropriate court to enjoin its usage. Which of these
two systems is less costly? Mayton argues that the former is cheaper. In
many instances, however, the latter may prove equally effective and no
more costly.1
2
Every state has a system already in place to pursue either criminal
prosecutions or equitable restraints. Neither process requires additional
personnel. To make out a criminal case, however, the local prosecutor
normally must secure the help of the police, make a grand jury present-
ment, prepare for and prosecute a jury trial, prove his case beyond a
reasonable doubt, and contend with the complexities of the criminal
process from arrest through arraignment, indictment, and trial. The en-
tire process usually takes several months. In contrast, to seek an injunc-
tion the prosecutor need only file a complaint, perhaps post a bond, and
prepare for a non-jury hearing in which he will bear only a civil burden
of proof. If he seeks a temporary restraining order, the hearing will oc-
cur within a matter of days or even hours. A hearing on a preliminary
injunction is also held quite soon after the filing of a complaint. The
trial on the merits may not take place any sooner than a criminal trial,
but if the prosecutor is successful in obtaining a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction, the issue may well become moot.
There are, to be sure, instances in which an equity action may not
be practicable. If the speech in question has already occurred or will
occur before the prosecutor can prepare a complaint, find a judge, and
obtain hearing, he may well prefer a criminal process of subsequent
punishment. A legislature could provide him with both, and even the
current prior restraint doctrine recognizes that equity can intervene in
some extreme cases despite the availability of a criminal sanction.
13
Most of the time, however, the prosecutor can proceed with equal or
greater speed, with fewer people, fewer hearings, and a less burdensome
11 Se, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959); cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952) (motion picture licensing scheme held invalid for denying license on ground that
film was "sacrilegious").
12 Mayton does recognize that in limited circumstances an injunction may be more ef-
fective. Mayton, supra note 1, at 272.
13 Both the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971), and the Progressive case, United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D.
Wis. 1979), are illustrative.
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standard of proof in equity than in criminal law. Indeed, if speed is
essential and the defendant cannot be immediately located, the prosecu-
tor in equity may even be able to obtain an exparte restraining order. 14
Nevertheless, Mayton argues that the equitable process is prefera-
ble because it is so narrowly circumscribed. Although he does recognize
the danger of overbroad injunctions, he is generally correct that injunc-
tions involve discrete parties and concrete problems. It does not follow,
however, that a system of injunctions will lead to less self-censorship
than a system of subsequent punishment. Admittedly, the threat of a
aiminal prosecution may have a slightly greater deterrent effect on some
people, but the risk-averse speaker or writer will want to avoid the costs
of an equitable proceeding as much as he will want to avoid any lawsuit.
A vigorous prosecutor can achieve broad self-censorship with a few well-
chosen and well-publicized equitable actions coupled with the threat of
continued enforcement just as well as he can with a few arrests and pros-
ecutions. In either case, the prosecutor's enthusiasm and willingness to
initiate actions determines the success of the prohibition. Unless the
criminal penalties are particularly severe and the risk of suffering them
is significant, the vigorous and enthusiastic pursuit of either injunctions
or criminal prosecutions can serve the prosecutor's purposes adequately.
II
THE CoNTEMPT POWER
In many situations, a prosecutor might prefer the injunctive rem-
edy because it is coupled with the judicial contempt power, which sup-
plements the civil remedy with a criminal-type enforcement
mechanism. The collateral bar rule, in particular, makes the contempt
power especially efficacious as a means of enforcing laws limiting speech.
The underlying statute may be unconstitutional or the court may have
issued an erroneous order, but that is of no avail to a defendant who
disobeys an injunction against speech. For instance, a prosecutor might
bring an action against a bookseller for selling a book containing the
word "mud," and the court might enjoin future sales of such books.
Subsequently, the law might be declared facially invalid or the injunc-
tion may be vacated as erroneously issued. But if the bookseller sold a
book containing the word "mud" subsequent to the issuance of the pre-
ventive order, he could still be held in contempt. The bookseller could
successfully challenge the contempt order only if the court lacked sub-
ject matter or personal jurisdiction.' 5 Although there may be some ex-
14 See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
15 Se Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). See genera/fy Rendeman,
Mfore on Void Orders, 7 GA. L. REv. 246, 249-71 (1973).
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ceptions to this rule at the state level, 16 the availability of the contempt
sanction not only makes the ordinary injunction a particularly powerful
weapon; it can also effectively ratify for purposes of punishment an
otherwise invalid law or order.
If an injunction of speech contemplates a single performance, then
the contempt sanction may be criminal in nature and the disobedient
party may be entitled to criminal due process in the contempt proceed-
ings. The injunction may be mandatory, however, in that it compels
speech-silence is as much a right of speech as is speaking' 7-- or it may
be limited in time in such a way that the coercive effect contemplates
cure by the defendant.18 In either case, refusal to comply with the order
normally will be treated as an instance of civil contempt and the defend-
ant will not be entitled to criminal due process, notwithstanding the
possibility of a jail sentence or a fine. 19 Even in cases of criminal con-
tempt, the judge who initially issued the order normally presides over
the contempt proceedings, a fact which by itself shortchanges funda-
mental notions of fairness in the criminal process. The net effect is that
the contempt sanction may make an injunction or other equitable order
a more powerful remedy than many criminal statutes, particularly those
prescribing a relatively mild misdemeanor sentence.
III
JUDGES AS LICENSORS
Regardless of the system of limitation employed, prosecutors will be
at least partly cast in the role of licensor. They may not serve the same
function as administrative licensors, but their understanding of and en-
thusiasm for laws affecting speech will set the tone for self-censorship by
establishing the risks for publications at the limits of acceptability. In a
system of subsequent punishment judges have a role similar to that of
licensors, but the police and prosecutor often make the initial decision
about the legality of a particular publication.
In a system of prior injunctive restraints, the judge's role as a licen-
sor is substantially enhanced. The prosecutor may still be the initial
actor, but the judge is forced to make a substantive decision early in the
proceedings-a decision that may effectively resolve the issue if time is a
matter of consequence. Thus, the relative reliability of judges as licen-
sors should be of considerable concern.
16 See, e.g., Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973); Dobbs,
Trial Court Error as an Exceas ofjuridiclion, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 854 (1965).
17 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
18 An order to testify after the assertion of an evidentiary privilege would constitute such
an order. For an example of the consequences of a refusal, see In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394
A.2d 330, ca'. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
19 See In re Dinnan, 625 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Professor Mayton apparently trusts judges more than any other
participants in this scheme. Judges are certainly charged with a duty to
consider constitutional restraints, although it does prosecutors a disser-
vice to imply that they too are not responsible for sensitivity to constitu-
tional concerns. Moreover, judges are not charged only with the duty
"to vindicate constitutional rights"; 20 their basic charge is to decide
cases within a constitutional framework. They are bound to enforce
constitutional provisions limiting speech as much as they are bound to
act as social agents for the promotion of speech. To be sure, judges
should be sensitive to constitutional constraints on governmental action,
but they must also be conscious of a variety of other concerns which may
or may not support the interests of free speech.
In fact, judges often have been active licensors themselves. This is
particularly evident in cases involving the tension between first amend-
ment and sixth amendment interests. These cases are significant be-
cause they involve situations in which judges, bound by all the
limitations ofjudicialprocess, have been ready censors because substantive
issues have not been adequately understood or developed. For example,
the sixth amendment "fair trial" cases have produced a flurry of "gag
orders," courtroom closures, and other limitations on both access to tri-
als and dissemination of information about them.2 1 The well-known
case of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart22 may have placed limits on the
use of gag orders against the press in order to prevent potentially unfair
pretrial publicity, 23 but gag orders continue to be applied to partici-
pants in the criminal process, such as witnesses, lawyers, jurors, police
officers, and court personnel. 24 Unless one of those subject to the order
complains, there may be considerable difficulty in obtaining review of
such an order. The Supreme Court's recent decision that the first
amendment supports a right of access to criminal trials, 25 however, may
20 Mayton, supira note 1, at 250.
21 See generally D. GILLMOR &J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAw 501-21 (3d ed.
1979) (collecting cases); F. SIEBERT, W. WILcox & G. HOUGH III, FREE AND FAIR TRIAL
(C. Bush ed. 1971).
22 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
23 Id. at 567-68. Reasoning that a "gag order" is a particularly pernicious form of prior
restraint, the Court suggested a variety of alternatives to ensure a fair trial: postponement of
the trial, change of venue, extensive voir dire, special jury instructions, sequestration, and
limitations on speech by the participants. Id. at 563-65. The last was, of course, simply an-
other form of the gag order. For the most recent federal guidelines, see U.S. Judicial Confer-
ence Guidelines on Fair Trial/Free Press (approved Sept. 25, 1980), 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1897 (1980).
24 See, e.g., Georgia v. Williams, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1852 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1981);
Ramsey v. Georgia Gazette, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1658 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1981). Some
suggest that the majority's strict focus on the prior restraint aspects of Nebraska Aess opened
the door to other, more restrictive limitations on press freedom. Se, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTrruriONAL LAw 1520-21 (10th ed. 1980); Barnett, The IA/e of
P'or Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977).
25 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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offer some basis for a third party challenge to a gag order. Judges often
issue gag orders sua sponte. Even when issued pursuant to a motion by a
participant in the criminal process, there often may be only a limited
hearing with no opportunity for those who may be directly or indirectly
affected by the order to be heard. The judge does not act as an adminis-
trative licensor whose decisions affect all speakers at large and he may
not encourage broad scale self-censorship of entire categories of speech,
such as sedition or obscenity. Nevertheless, the judge who issues a gag
order effectively suppresses any speech about a particular subject-one
that may be of considerable public interest-by a class of persons who
are subject to immediate criminal sanctions for violation of the order.
This holds true even if the order is later found to have been erroneously
issued.2
6
Another relatively common method of prior restraint employed by
judges is the closure order.27 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,28
the Supreme Court held for the first time that there is a constitutional
right, based in part on the first amendment, of access to criminal trials.
29
The Court has been reluctant, however, to derive from the first amend-
ment a right of access to other types of government information.30 Anal-
ysis of recent actions in this area demonstrates that (1) the denial of
access to information, to a place, or to an event such as a trial is an
extraordinarily effective method of restricting the dissemination of infor-
mation; and (2) except as limited by the Supreme Court, trial judges
have been almost frenetic in their rush to issue orders denying access.
For example, following the Supreme Court's decision in Gannett Co. v. De-
26 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
27 See, e.g., Indiana ex reL Post-Tribune v. Porter Superior Court, 6 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2300 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1980); Oneonta Star v. Mogavero, 6 Media L Rep. (BNA) 2271
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
28 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1980).
29 The full impact of RichmondNewspapers is still unclear because the Court let stand its
1979 decision in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), in which the Court sus-
tained an order closing a pre-trial evidentiary hearing in the face of both first and sixth
amendment challenges. Id. at 379-93. Compare Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to Sex
Crime Trialr, 22 B.C.L. REV. 361 (1981) with O'Brien, The Trials and Tribulations of Courtroom
S&creq andJudicial Crafhmansiph: Re&ctionr on Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, CoMMu-
NICATIONS & LAw 3 (Spring 1981). In situations other than those of criminal trials, the Court
has not yet accepted the notion of a first amendment right to gather information or to gain
access to public places or public information, although the Freedom of Information Act of
1966, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976) and various state sunshine laws provide a statutory basis in some
cases for access to government information. See Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1980, 1981 DuKE LJ. 338. In the 1978 case of Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S.
1 (1978), the Court narrowly rejected a first amendment right to gather government informa-
tion or gain access to public places. ChiefJustice Burgerjoined by Justices White and Rehn-
quist, wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Stewart concurred separately, id. at 16, while
Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Powell dissented, id. at 19. Justices Marshall and Blackmun
did not participate.
30 ee note 29 supra.
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Pasquale, 3 1 an unprecedented series of courtroom closures ensued.3 2
Judges have also readily limited the use of cameras and recording de-
vices and the taking of interviews in and around courthouses. 3s These
orders may be issued in a good faith attempt to preserve the sanctity of
the criminal process, but they reveal an apparently common tendency to
be less than sensitive to broad first amendment rights and interests.
Some judicial insensitivity to first amendment interests has also
been apparent in the cases involving assertions of reporters' rights to
maintain the confidentiality of sources. Although news gathering may
involve sensitive, confidential communications, the reporter's privilege
has received only grudging judicial approval.34 If one chooses to remain
silent to protect a confidence for reasons of conscience or just personal
eccentricity, that choice is as much an exercise of the right of free speech
as a lecture given in a public forum.3 5 A judicial order to speak has the
same force and effect on an individual who prefers to remain silent as
does an order to be silent on one who prefers to speak. Such an order,
although not a prior restraint, is effectively identical in that it absolutely
prevents, upon threat of criminal sanction, the exercise of a first amend-
ment right. Although prior to issuance of the order to speak there may
be some opportunity to be heard-unlike the usual gag order proce-
dure-the process may be truncated and the penalties swift and se-
vere.36 Indeed, the procedural protection at the penalty stage may be
31 443 U.S. 368 (1979). See note 29 sufira.
32 See generally Lewis, A Pa/ic Right to Know About Public Institutions: The First Amendment as
Sword, 1980 Sup. Cr. REV. 1 (discussing impact of 6annett) (citing REPORTERS CoMMITTEE
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, COURT WATCH SUMMARY (May 1980)).
33 See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974);
Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970); Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629
(5th Cir. 1967); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634 (D. Minn. 1972); In re Acuff,
331 F. Supp. 819 (D. N. Mex. 1971).
34 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); State v. Sandsrom, 224 Kan. 573,
581 P.2d 812 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d
254 (1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966
(1974).
35 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). Saying that a man has a right to be
silent does not necessarily mean that the law cannot justifiably compel him to speak. I only
mean to indicate another circumstance in which the right of speech-or silence--has fallen
prey to arguments favoring contrary interests in the judicial process.
36 The basic dispute in the Myron Farber case, for instance, concerned process. Farber,
a New York Times reporter, invoked the reporters privilege of confidentiality in the murder
trial of a New Jersey doctor who allegedly had been one of the subjects of Farber's articles
about mysterious deaths in a New Jersey hospital. New Jersey's "shield law" recognizes such
a privilege but allows a judge to override the privilege in certain instances. The fundamental
dispute was whether the judge could inspect the evidence and hear the testimony in camera to
determine its relevance, or whether he had to make the initial decision as to relevance without
any disclosure by the reporter. Farber argued for the latter interpretation on the ground that
any disclosure would violate the privilege. The judge ruled against him, but he never did
divulge his sources. To protect his sources and principles he spent 40 days in jail and his
employer paid a large fine. See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert denied, 439 U.S.
997 (1978); N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1980, § B, at 2, col. 5.
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especially limited because a continued refusal to speak will usually be
treated as an instance of civil rather than criminal contempt.37
Instances of the judge as licensor may also arise in cases involving
statutory, contractual, or common law limitations on speech. The statu-
tory category includes those cases involving the proposed publication of
a book, lecture, article, or essay by a current or former government em-
ployee who has had access to confidential information.38  The second
category includes disputes between employers and employees who are
contractually bound to keep certain trade information in confidence,
but who may want, for example, to publish research findings in trade
journals or scientific periodicals.3 9 Common law limitations involve in-
stances in which speech runs afoul of a dignitary interest, such as pri-
vacy, or of a proprietary interest in one's visage, character, or persona.40
Cases in this third category may also derive in part from statutory limi-
tations.4 1 A judge presented with such a case may be confronted with a
decision whether to intervene in equity or to defer to law.4 2 Moreover,
whatever remedy he deems appropriate, he must decide whether the al-
leged injury is of more consequence than the limitation sought to be
imposed on speech. This decision may be particularly complex when
the injury implicates an interest that itself has constitutional implica-
tions.43 Unless the plaintiff's interest is of constitutional dimension the
balance generally should be struck in favor of speech, but this balancing
forces the judge regularly into the role of a licensor.44
Professor Mayton argues that judges are best suited to decide such
disputes; they are preferable to an administrative licensor charged with
a narrower purpose of enforcing a particular law limiting speech. A
bureaucrat may indeed approach his task with a certain tunnel vision
that places speech interests in a less favored position. That, however, is
not necessarily the fault of the bureaucrat as such; rather, the fault may
37 As the old saying goes, the person subject to the order holds the keys to the jail-all he
has to do is speak.
38 Set general.y Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
39 This obviously involves property concepts as well as speech interests.
40 Set, e.g., Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.
1980), noted in 67 CoNELL LAw RFv. 398 (1982); Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. dnied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Lugosi v. Universal Pic-
tures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
41 Se, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976). Segenera' Hll, Defa-
mation and hn'va Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. Rav. 1205 (1976).
42 This difficulty is well illustrated by the running battle between Jacqueline Kennedy
Onassis and the photographer Ron Gallela. See Gallela v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir.
1973).
43 The privacy cases raise this problem. Although the tort of invasion of privacy has its
origins in trespass theory, the notion of privacy as a protected interest has also found support
in the Constitution and even in the first amendment. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Note, fhz, in the First Amendment, 82 YAL L.J. 1462 (1973).
44 Admittedly, virtually every attempt to regulate speech involves some balancing in-
cluding, to a degree, the "clear and present danger" test.
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lie in the enabling legislation that defines his duties and responsibilities.
If a bureaucrat were told, for example, that the presumption in any
balancing should weigh heavily in favor of speech, and if he operated
under certain procedural limitations, 45 then his job definition would not
be significantly different from that of a judge.
Ultimately, then, there is no good reason to prefer judges as a class
over administrative licensors as a class, provided that the charge to the
two classes is similar. Indeed, judges as a class have often manifested a
significant degree of indifference to first amendment values in compari-
son to other interests. The criminal process provides the best example.
The argument in favor of gag orders, closures, and other such devices is
often couched in terms of competing constitutional rights, but the argu-
ment often flies wide of the mark. Many things can be done to ensure
the fairness of a criminal trial short of squelching speech rights, 46 but
there is a disturbing judicial tendency to limit speech, perhaps because it
is the simplest, least expensive, and most efficient method for achieving
the end sought. The same is sometimes true of judicial remedies for the
apparent conflict between the constitutional right to compel witnesses to
testify and the speech right to remain silent.
IV
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF PRIOR RESTRAINT
Professor Mayton argues that, at least since Near v. Minnesota,4
7
judges have fallen prey to a tendency to equate the old English licensing
scheme with injunctions of speech obtained through the judicial process.
On that point he may well be correct; at least the evidence he musters in
support of his argument suggests that conclusion. But it does not neces-
sarily follow that a misunderstanding of the historical meaning of "prior
restraint" or a proper appreciation for procedural safeguards in the judi-
cial process permits the conclusion that injunctions of speech, rather
than post-speech civil or criminal sanctions, should be the favored
method for imposing limitations on speech. In fact, Mayton's own argu-
ment-that laws such as the Sedition Act,48 the Espionage Act,49 and
the Smith Act 50 cause excessive self-censorship compared with an in-
45 The Administrative Procedure Act does provide procedural due process safeguards
generally equivalent to those available in the judicial process. Administrative Procedure Act
of 1966, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-58 & 701-03 (1976).
46 Judges have available, for example, the power to order a change of venue, lengthy
and searching voir dire, sequestration of jurors, and the power to maintain close control over
the decorum in the courtroom itself. See note 23 supra.
47 283 U.S. 697 (1931). For more on the background of Near, see generally F. FRiENDLY,
MINNESOTA RAG (1981).
48 Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
49 Ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917).
50 Ch. 439, § 2(a)(1), 54 Stat. 671 (1940) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976)).
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junction of a particular defendant's speech 5 '-suggests the real problem:
the failure to articulate a comprehensive theory of prior restraint.
Mayton quite correctly asserts that the risk-averse will refrain from
speaking in violation of a criminal prohibition and that much accepta-
ble speech might be stifled by a vague law.52 A vague law, although
imposing a subsequent punishment, effectively restrains speech in ad-
vance and is itself as much a prior restraint as an injunction. That was
certainhily Justice Black's opinion of the Smith Act as it applied in Dennis
v. United States.5 3
A prior restraint may result from legislation, bureaucratic edict, or
judicial decree. The judicial process may be protected by substantial
procedural safeguards-although neither the legislative process nor the
administrative process is bereft of them-and a judge's order may be
highly specific rather than of broad general application. In those re-
spects the judicial process may have some advantages, but prior re-
straints, from whatever source and through whatever process, all curtail
speech before it happens. To use the common phrase, they "freeze"
speech, they do not just chill it. With injunctions, an aggressive prosecu-
tor can both freeze and chill speech.
A prior restraint operates as a governmental decision to prohibit
absolutely that particular speech-a decision that, as Justice Black ar-
gued, runs counter to the most basic premise of the first amendment.
On the other hand, a system of subsequent punishment, properly lim-
ited, may have an inhibitory effect, but a speaker can proceed to speak if
he is willing to risk possible prosecution. Simply stated, there is a world
of difference between a government statement that one cannot speak at
all and a statement that one can speak out at some risk of paying a
specified cost. The problem is to ensure that the cost and risk associated
with the latter limitation do not transmogrify it into the former. That
task is difficult, but not impossible.
Professor Mayton argues that laws against speech are inherently
vague and that this vagueness renders any legislation imposing a system
of subsequent punishment susceptible to the criticism that it requires
unnecessary self-censorship. Thus, it acts as a form of broad prior re-
straint. 54 Some laws are perhaps proper targets of this criticism, but a
51 Mayton, supra note 1, at 256-57.
52 Id. at 256; see generaly id. at 254-58.
53 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
The indictment is that they conspired to organize the Communist Party and
to use speech or newspapers and other publications in the future to teach and
advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government. No matter how it is
worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I
believe the First Amendment forbids. I would hold § 3 of the Smith Act au-
thorizing this prior restrain unconstitutional on its face and as applied.
Id. at 579 (Black, J., dissenting).
54 Mayton, supra note 1, at 254-57.
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law against speech can be drafted with reasonable precision. It can be
as narrowly focused as an injunction and thus need not carry with it the
prohibitory force of an absolute prior restraint. Making an overt act a
prerequisite for punishing speech, as Mayton suggests, 55 may aid in the
precision with which the limitation is applied,5 6 but it is not necessary to
precise definition. Explicitness and clarity may be achieved by specify-
ing the speech prohibited (certain listed words may not be spoken by
anyone appearing on radio or televisionD and identifying a class against
whom a prohibition is directed (military officers in uniform while on
active duty may not make public speeches without prior approval of the
content by their respective commanding officers, or some other desig-
nated superior58). Justifying a limitation may be difficult, but if it is
supportable, a precise, narrowly defined limitation can be imposed.
As a matter of fact, most laws against speech are relatively vague,
but many of these laws are based on judicial decisions. Although legisla-
tors have enacted statutes dealing with libel, slander, invasion of pri-
vacy, and obscenity, the critical law on such matters is judge-made.
Precision is frequently not a hallmark of the judicial process-judicial
definitions are often vague, inconsistent, and contradictory.5 9 Whatever
the sources of vague laws, the remedy for the ills that flow from them
should be the removal of vagueness and the substitution of precision.
This can be accomplished through a system of subsequent punishment;
we need not reverse the historical tendency to avoid injunctions of
speech, nor need we reverse the traditional deference of equity to law in
the American system.
A good process--one that is replete with safeguards against abuse-
can be employed vigorously to enforce substantive law that is vague and
overbroad so that it encourages wholesale self-censorship. This is not to
say that process is unimportant; to the contrary, it is often critical. A
judge bound by the constraints of the Constitution and precedent is
55 Id. at 258-59, 262.
56 The law of conspiracy, however, is filled with examples to the contrary. See generally
Note, Conspirafy and the First Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872 (1970).
57 See, e.g., FCC iv. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Such a limitation isjusti-
fled by the government licensing monopoly over the limited spectrum of airwaves. See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376-79 (1969). In point of fact, the statute
relied upon in Pacifa was vague, but one could be drafted that contained a specific list of the
dirty words prohibited.
58 For a discussion of the free speech rights of servicemen, see Imwinkelried & Zillman,
An Evolution in the First Amendment: Ovebreadth Analjsis and Free Speech Within the Militay Com-
munity, 54 TEXAs L. REv. 42 (1975).
59 The agonies some courts go through in applying the Miller obscenity test, Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), are truly tortured. See, e.g., Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe,
610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980). In another area, truth is still an absolute defense to a libel
action, but not to an invasion of privacy action for the publication of true private facts. This
can lead to an analysis almost as complex and confusing as the one employed in the obscenity
cases. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
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much to be preferred over an administrative licensor whose only charge
is to encourage public decency. Nonetheless, process alone affords lim-
ited protection for speech. Stronger protection results from a proper ap-
preciation of the substantive limits that government can impose on
individual expression, and the most severe limitation that can ever be
imposed is one that prevents speech from occuring at all. This is the real
reason for the concern with prior restraints. If limitations on speech can
be justified, the limitations to be preferred are those that impose a risk
or a cost without being prohibitory. The cost may be a deterrent to
some, but it is not prohibitive unless the cost and the risk of paying it are
inordinatel high,60 in which case the limitation should be characterized
as a form of prior restraint and not a form of subsequent punishment.
CONCLUSION
Professor Mayton's attempt to force us to reconsider a neglected area
of first amendment law is much needed. Many of Mayton's concerns,
however, can be alleviated by the use of a declaratory judgment process
to determine the legitimacy of a particular form of speech prior to any
criminal action against a publisher or distributor. This approach will
not succeed in all cases, but it has been used with some success to protect
booksellers, clerks, movie ticket takers, and others in the line of
distribution.6
1
In any event, I disagree with his conclusion because (1) the costs to
the state of enforcing injunctions that cause massive self-censorship are
not demonstrably greater than the costs of effectively enforcing a system
of subsequent punishment; (2) judges can wield tremendous pre- and
post-speech powers that, through equity, can deter speech as effectively
as any system of subsequent punishment; (3) judges have not necessarily
shown themselves to be especially sensitive "licensors"; (4) prior re-
straints take many forms and are to be avoided in any form because they
are the most intrusive, most damaging, and most limiting form of state
action against individual speech; 62 and (5) substance, not process, is the
best approach to the problem.
Our concern should not be entirely with the process; rather, it
should be with the justification for any limitation on speech and the
60 Of course, there must be a minimum risk of enforcement for the law to have much
effect.
61 See American Book Seller Ass'n v. McAuliffe, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2282 (N.D. Ga.
1981); Louisiana v. Walden Books, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1696 (La. Sup. Ct. 1980); Septum
v. Keller, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1116 (5th Cir. 1980) (theater owner allowed to seek federal
declaratory and injunctive relief from threatened enforcement), remanded, 7 Media L. Rep.
1664 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (movie found obscene); Missouri v. All Star News Agency, 5 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1076 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1979).
62 With respect to the fourth point, Professor Mayton apparently agrees with me at least
in part, because he does seem to recognize that prior restraints may be varied in form.
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means by which a limitation may be imposed with precision so as not to
deter speech that is not justifiably subject to limitation. That may not
be easy, but it is the fundamental task.
